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DIVORCE AND THE CATHOLIC LAWYER
REV. JOHN J. COUGHLIN, O.F.M.*
On January 28, 2002, Pope John Paul II focused his annual address to
the officials of the Roman Rota on the topic of the indissolubility of mar-
riage. 1 At the conclusion of this theological and canonical analysis, the
Holy Father made a few short statements cautioning civil lawyers about
divorces cases. The following day, a story in The New York Times carried
the headline "John Paul Says Catholic Bar Must Refuse Divorce Cases."
The article construed the pope's reference as a blanket prohibition against
Catholic lawyers handling divorce cases. It further questioned whether
the prohibition contradicted the Pontiff's prior emphasis on compassion
and pastoral sensitivity for divorced persons.2 The reaction to the pope's
address was certain to cause some concern among Catholics who take
pontifical teaching seriously, and especially among those of us who are at-
torneys. More careful examination, however, reveals that the pope's state-
ment flows from a well-developed and coherent doctrine on marriage,
which belies a reductionistic approach.3 In this brief article, I provide an
overview of the scriptural and historical tradition as well as contemporary
theoretical underpinnings of the principle of indissolubility. My modest
purpose is not to present a comprehensive study, but to attempt a fair ex-
position of the Holy Father's remarks and their application to lawyers and
judges.
I. Scriptural Foundation and Historical Development
The principle of indissolubility in the Catholic tradition enjoys a long
and complex historical development. 4 As the tradition forms the scrip-
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame University. This article is based on remarks delivered
at the Fordham University School of Law on September 19, 2002.
1 Available at http:/Iwww.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2002/
january/documents/ hf/jp-ii_20020128_roman-rotaen.html. (hereinafter "John Paul II,
2002 Address to Roman Rota"). At the time of preparation of this article, the official text of
the Pope's address had not yet been published in Acta Apostolicae Sedis (hereinafter AAS).
2 Melinda Henneberger, The New York Times (January 29, 2002) 2.
3 See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., "Forming An Agenda-Ethics and Legal Ethics," Notre
Dame Law Review 77 (2002) 977, n. 21. He notes that The New York Times report went
"too far"
4 See generally John T. Noonan, Jr., The Power to Dissolve (Cambridge: Harvard
Belknap. 1972): Theodore Mackin, S.J., The Marital Sacrament (New York: Paulist Press,
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tural and theological basis of Pope John Paul's statement, it seems help-
ful to highlight some important features of this evolution.
A. The Teaching of Jesus About Divorce
The pope chose Sacred Scripture as the starting point of analysis.
5
Matthew 19: 3-9 contains a somewhat unambiguous condemnation of
divorce:
Some Pharisees approached him and tested him saying, "Is it law-
ful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause whatever?" He said
in reply, "Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator
'made them male and female' and said, for this reason a man shall
leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two
shall become one flesh? So they are no longer two, but one flesh.
Therefore, what God has joined together, no human being must
separate." They said to him, "Then why did Moses command that
the man give the woman a bill of divorce and dismiss [her]?" He
said to them, "Because of the hardness of your hearts Moses al-
lowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was
not so. I say to you, whoever divorces his wife (unless the mar-
riage is unlawful) and marries another commits adultery.
Matthew's account of the prohibition on divorce is a doublet to a peri-
cope that occurs in a different form and wording in Mark's Gospel.6
Exegetical analysis discloses that the fundamental dispute is over the
meaning of Deuteronomy 24, which established the conditions upon
which Moses permitted divorce. A first-century Palestinian rabbinical
dispute arose from two different interpretations of the conditions for Mo-
saic divorce. The disciple of Rabbi Shammai held that divorce could be
granted only on some grave ground such as adultery. In contrast, the fol-
lowers of Rabbi Hillel adopted a more liberal interpretation that permit-
ted divorce for a wide spectrum of conduct ranging from adultery to triv-
ial grounds such as a wife's loud talking in the house or poor preparation
1989); John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract, Marriage, Religion, and Law in the
Western Tradition (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press. 1997).
5 John Paul II, 2002 address to the Roman Rota, 3.
6 Mark 10: 2-12; Matthew 5: 32; Luke 6: 18; cf. I Corinthians 7: 10-11. See John P.
Meier, A Marginal Jew, Mentor, Message, and Miracles, vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday,
1994) 178.
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of a meal.7 In Matthew's account, the Pharisees attempt to force Jesus to
accept one of the two teachings and thus alienate the adherents of either
of the two rabbinical schools.
In a fashion typical of the ipsissima vox, Jesus responds by reject-
ing both approaches and instead proposing a radical new teaching on di-
vorce. 8 First, Jesus' teaching is radical because it proposes that the mari-
tal union remains an indissoluble relationship intended by God. The cita-
tion of Genesis reminds the hearers of the natural foundation implanted
by the Creator for the "essential properties of marriage."9 Second, the
teaching challenges a worldview in which women were considered to
have less status than men. Pursuant to Mosaic Law, only the man had
the capacity to issue the bill of divorce. In rejecting this practice, Jesus
calls for a deeper respect for women. 10 Third, Jesus, the eschatological
prophet, expresses the hope that in the consummation of time the Cre-
ator's intention for marriage would be perfectly fulfilled.'1 1 The reference
to "hardness of hearts" conveys the eschatological shift from accepting
marriage as a mere social convention to committing to a transformative
life-long relationship intended by God. This radical refashioning requires
a certain interiority on the part of the spouses in the here and now.
B. Historical Development
The teaching of Jesus constitutes the foundation for the historical de-
velopment of the principle of indissolubility. Jesus' citation of Genesis
points to the natural law basis for indissolubility. 12 Even more impor-
tantly, the historical development of the principle of indissolubility is in-
7 See John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew Companions and Competitors, vol. 3 (New
York: Doubleday, 2001) 337.
8 Ibid., 336-337.
9 John Paul II, 2002 Address to the Roman Rota, 2. See Meier, A Marginal Jew, Com-
panions and Competitors, 504. 1983 code, canon 1056: "The essential properties of mar-
riage are unity and indissolubility, which in Christian marriage obtain a special firmness
in virtue of the sacrament."
10 See Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1997)
104. Stark's sociological analysis is a helpful although not necessarily exclusive explana-
tion for the rise of Christianity during the first several centuries of the Church's history.
11 See Meier, A Marginal Jew, Companions and Competitors, 337.
12 In his 2001 address to the Rotal officials, John Paul II focused on the idea of marriage
as a natural institution. He contrasted the metaphysical understanding of nature with the
historical and existential reality of culture. See John Paul II, 2001 address to the Roman
Rota: AAS 92 (2000). 350-355. Available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john
paul-ii/speeches/2001 /february/documents/hf/jp-ii_20010201 _roman-rota-en.html.
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tertwined with the formulation of marriage as a sacrament. In my view,
the understanding of the Catholic doctrine that marriage is a sacrament
instituted by Christ only stands to benefit through a full encounter with
the historical development. 13 Again, I emphasize that my modest pur-
pose is to afford only a few salient aspects of this historical development
as background to the papal teaching.
1. The Patristic Era
Neither the patristic era as a whole, nor any single voice within it, yield-
ed a complete theory of marriage. Rather, the thought of various patristic
figures was prompted in response to an array of contemporary religious,
political, social, and economic realities that were shaping the future of
marriage. 14 Not the least among these were gnostic and manichean influ-
ences that held a generally negative view of materiality and preferred
chastity over marriage. 15 Perhaps the most important contribution of the
patristic thinkers was that of Saint Augustine in the fifth century. Consis-
tent with his fundamental anthropology, Augustine linked original sin and
sexual concupiscence and understood marriage as a remedy for such con-
cupiscence. 16 In his pastoral concern to support Christian marriage, Au-
gustine taught that fallen nature (concupiscence) was healed and elevated
through Christ's grace. Against the Manichees, Augustine attributed a
threefold good to marriage:fides, proles, sacramentum, 17 Fides or the nat-
ural fidelity between the spouses means that in marriage the spouses avoid
all sexual activity apart from their exclusive union. Proles is the blessing
of children who continue the human race and the Church. Sacramentum
13 In his condemnation of modernism issued through the Holy Office on July 4, 1907,
Saint Pius X decreed that "If anyone states that marriage is not truly and properly one of
the seven sacraments of the New Law of the Gospel, or states that the sacrament was not
instituted by Christ but was invented by men in the Church, or states that it does not con-
fer grace, let him be anathema." Denziger-Schonmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum, Deft-
nitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 23rd ed. (Barcelona/Freiburg i.
Breisgau: Herder, 1963) no. 3451, 673. Likewise, 1983 code, canon 1055 § I affirms the
historical claim that marriage "has been raised by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament."
The doctrine that Christ instituted the sacrament of marriage does not conflict with the re-
ality that the theology of the sacrament enjoys a rich historical development and that the
development is ongoing in the life of the Church.
14 See Mackin, The Marital Sacrament, 184-185.
15 Ibid., 100-112, 211-212.
16 See De Genesi ad litteram, Bk. 9, Ch. 7; in J. P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Com-
pletus, Series Latina, vol. 34 (Paris: 1844-1855) 397 (hereinafter "PL").
17 Ibid.
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acknowledges the theology that understands marriage as a symbolic ex-
pression of Christ's love for the Church. 18 For Augustine, the sacramen-
turn signified the indissoluble bond between the spouses that remains for
as long as both live and which "neither separation or union with another
can remove." 19 However, the meaning of the concept sacramentum in the
writings of patristic figures such as Augustine, Ambrose and Tertulian is
far from unequivocal, and has bequeathed as its legacy the perennial prob-
lem of interpretation.20 At the same time, the interpretation of the mean-
ing of sacrament should not detract from the fact that all of the great pa-
tristic figures, consistent with the teaching of Jesus, understood marriage
as a life-long union.
21
2. Medieval Canon Law and Theology
From the end of the eleventh century to the thirteenth century, the me-
dieval canonists affirmed indissolubility as an essential property of the
contractual nature of marriage. 22 Gratian and the school at Bologna
taught that the contract requires consent and consummation. 23 In con-
trast, the Parisians followed the position of Peter Lombard, which held
that a valid marriage contract requires consent to conjugal society (per
18 Augustine's understanding of marriage as sacrament was drawn from the Pauline
view that the relationship of husband and wife is analogous to that between Christ and the
Church. The spouses' love for each other is indissoluble as is Christ's love in emptying
himself and giving his life for the Church. Ephesians 5: 24-25.
19 De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia ad Valerium Comitem Libri Duo, Bk. 1, Ch. 10, in PL
44,420.
20 One of the earliest uses of the term sacramentum in relation to marriage appears in
Tertullian. It seems to have had the meaning of a religious oath or promise and also of a
type or image. See e.g., Divinae Institutiones, PL 6: 1080; De Monogamia, PL 1: 920-
921. Ambrose employed the word sacramentum in a text in which he urges husbands not
to engage in extra-marital intercourse with prostitutes or slaves, but it is not at all clear
from the context whether the word refers to baptism or marriage. See De Abraham, 4, PL
14, 431. See also Mackin, The Marital Sacrament, 131; 164-177; 191; 196-197, 215-
227.
21 The author identified as Ambrosiaster held that divorce was permitted in certain cir-
cumstances. See In epistulas ad Corinthios prima, 7, 11, in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesi-
asticorum Latinorum, vol. 8 1-I (Vindobonae: Hoelder, Pichler, Tempsky, 1968) 75. See
also Anthony J. Bevilacqua, "The History of the Indissolubility of Marriage," Catholic
Theological Societ3 of America Proceedings 22 (1972) 253-308.
22 See Witte, From Sacrament to Contract, 25.
23 C. 27, q. 2 d.p.c. 2, d.p.c. 29, d.p.c. 45. See John A. Alesandro, Gratian's Notion of
Marital Consummation (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1971) 1.
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verba de praesenti).2 4 In either case, the emphasis on consent served to
weaken the feudal lord's control over vassals and serfs, and it attested to
the dignity of the human person.25 Eventually, a Roman-Parisian ap-
proach held that the free consent of the spouses creates a marriage, which
is consummated through sexual intercourse. 26 The compromise ap-
proach led to the question as to at what point in the contractual formation
of a marriage the command of Jesus about indissolubility attached.27 The
response was found in the canonical practice that permitted annulment of
non-consummated marriages. 28 In the thirteenth century, Saint Thomas
Aquinas developed a theological understanding that integrated the con-
sent and union into the sacramental. He held that the contract and sacra-
24 Petrus Lombardus, Libri IV sententiarum, 2nd ed. (Florence: Collegio di San
Bonaventura, 1916) bk. 4, dist. 27.2. See Thomas P. Doyle, OP., "Title VII, Marriage," in
James A. Coriden, Thomas J. Green and Donald E. Heintschel, The Code of Canon Law,
A Text and Commentary (New York: Paulist Press, 1985) 812; James A. Brundage, Law,
Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987)
235-242, 260-278. The emphasis on the formation of marriage through the free consent
of the spouses also raised the issue of clandestine marriages often between persons when
the consent of their parents could not be obtained. The common opinion was that those
who married secretly did so illicitly but that the marriage was nonetheless valid. See idem,
Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, 187-188.
25 See Michael M. Sheehan, C.S.B., "Marriage of the Unfree and the Poor," in James
K. Farge, ed., Marriage, Family, and Law in Medieval Europe (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1996) 211, 246. He concludes that by the fourteenth century, the medieval
canon law had developed with the result that marriage was available to even the poorest
adults at the lower socio-economic levels of society. The fully developed canonical theo-
ry functioned to annul marriages entered through fear, coercion, fraud, and mistake. The
theory granted equality to husbands and wives with regard to conjugal rights (debitum). It
also provided for annulment in cases of consanguinity, affinity, incapacity, non-consum-
mation, inebriation and bigamy. It granted divorce a mensa et thoro on the grounds of
adultery, heresy or cruelty. It punished abortion, infanticide and child abuse as contrary to
the natural law of procreation. It encouraged relations between husband and wife based on
mutual respect and self-sacrificial love. See Witte, From Sacrament to Contract, 32-36.
26 Pope Innocent III (1189-1216) confirmed the teaching about the formation of mar-
riage. See X 4.1.25; 4.4.5; 4.5.6.
27 See James A. Coriden, The Indissolubility Added to Christian Marriage by Con-
summation: An Historical Study of the Period From the End of the Patristic Age to the
Death of Pope Innocent III (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1961) 49-50.
28 This practice had been approved by Gratian. See C. 27 q. 2 d.p.c. 2, d.p.c. 29, d.p.c.
45. The medieval theory also annulled marriages on the basis of the Pauline Privilege (1
Corinthians 7: 12-15), which permitted a newly converted Christian to remarry if their
former, non-Christian, spouse departed. See John P. Beal, "Chapter IX, Separation of the
Spouses," in John P. Beal, James A. Coriden and Thomas J. Green, eds. New Commentary
on the Code of Canon Law (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2000) 1361-1362.
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ment constitute one reality characterized by a lifelong and intimate union
of the spouses. 29 Thomas distinguished three phases in the institution of
the sacrament. Prior to the Fall, marriage fulfilled the natural need for
procreation. Subsequent to the Fall, the lapsarian status of humanity re-
quired the natural healing through the Mosaic law. In the new law, Christ
instituted the sacrament of marriage as an indissoluble relationship. Pur-
suant to the image of Ephesians 4: 24-25, Thomas agreed with Augus-
tine that the sacrament reflects Christ's relation to the Church.30 How-
ever, the high contractual and sacramental theory developed by the
canonists and theologians did not result in a rigid jurisprudence in the ec-
clesiastical courts. During the latter middle ages, the principle of indis-
solubility met certain legal exceptions, and it was not altogether difficult
to evade the rule in a canonical tribunal.3'
3. Reformation and Trent
The contradiction between the principle of indissolubility and the
practices of the ecclesiastical courts counted among the abuses to which
the Protestant Reformers objected.32 Following the lead of Martin
Luther, the Protestant reformers had denied that marriage was one of the
seven sacraments instituted by Christ. 33 In January of 1547, the Council
29 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Westminister, Maryland: Christian
Classics, 1981) Supp. Q. 42, a. 1, 5.
30 Sancti ThomaeAquinatis Opera Omnia, Tomus VII: Commentarium in Quattuor Li-
bros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, vol. II (Parmae: 1873) IV, 26, 2, at 920-
921.
31 See Brian Tierney, "Canon Law and Church Institutions in the Late Middle Ages,"
in Rights, Laws and Infallibility in Medieval Thought (Hampshire: Variorum, 1997) VII,
66-68. Cf. Michael M. Sheehan, C.S.B., "The Formation and Stability of Marriage in
Fourteenth-Century England: Evidence of an Ely Register," in Marriage. Family, and Law
in Medieval Europe, 38, 74-76. He concludes that the marriage bond was vulnerable in
cases of clandestinity but less so in cases of consanguinity and affinity. See also Richard
H. Helmholz, The Spirit of Classical Canon Law (Athens, Georgia: The University of
Georgia Press, 1996) 240-241.
32 See Martin Luther, "On Married Life," in Walther I. Brandt, ed., Luther's Works,
vol. 45-I (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1962) 36-37.
33 In May 1515, Luther delivered his "Sermon on the State of Marriage," in which he
essentially affirmed the Catholic tradition about the sacramentality of marriage. A Sermon
on the Estate of Marriage in James Atkinson, ed. Luther's Works, vol. 44 (Philadelphia:
Fotress Press, 1966) 9-10. At little more than a year latter, however, Luther proclaimed
marriage to be only a natural institution and therefore under secular rather than ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction. Prelude to the Babylonian Captivit of the Church, in Abdel Ross Wentz,
ed., Luther's Works, vol. 36 (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959) 95-96. For a discus-
sion of Philip Melancthon and John Calvin, see Mackin, The Marital Sacrament, 420-426.
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of Trent responded to the Protestant position and declared the validity of
all seven sacraments. 34 In 1563, the council specifically addressed the
Catholic understanding of marriage to confirm the tradition that it con-
stitutes an indissoluble union intended by Christ.35 In the same year, the
decree Tametsi recognized that the spouses are the ministers of the sacra-
ment, which must be witnessed by a priest and at least two other per-
sons. 36 The decree anathematized those who held that the invalidity of a
marriage entered into by the spouses without the consent of their par-
ents.37 However, the council declined to adopt proposed language in
canon 7, which would have anathematized Greek Catholics who fol-
lowed the Orthodox discipline that permitted divorce and remarriage for
the innocent party following adultery. 38 As promulgated, the anathema of
canon 7 stated: "If anyone says that the Church errs when it has taught
and still teaches ... that the bond of marriage canont be dissolved be-
cause of adultery ..."39 The actual wording thus confirmed Roman
Catholic discipline and condemned Protestants who had claimed the
error, even as it permitted the Greek Catholic practice to continue.a
Their concern for ecclesial unity notwithstanding, the bishops at Trent
were clear that marriage is in nature and sacrament an indissoluble
union.
4 1
4. Secularization and the Catholic Response
While the Protestant complaint called attention to the contradiction
between indissolubility and tribunal practice, it also paved the way for
34 See Decretum primum [De sacramentis], n. 1, in Norman P. Tanner, S.J., ed., De-
crees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 2, Trent to Vatican II (London: Sheed & Ward,
1990) 684 (hereinafter "Tanner").
35 See Doctrina de sacramento matrimonii, in Tanner, 2:753.
36 See Canones super reformatione circa matrimonium, Ch. 1, in Tanner, 2: 755-756.
"7 Ibid.
38 See Mackin, The Marital Sacrament, n. 70, 447-448.
39 See Canones de sacramento matrimonii, 7, in Tanner, 754-755.
40 See Mackin, The Marital Sacrament, n. 70, 447-448.
41 The Council of Trent did not fully resolve the question of whether the contract
might be separated from the sacrament in marriage. In refutation of Melchior Cano, Saint
Robert Bellarmine held that marriage enjoyed a certain degree of indissolubility (quam-
dam indissolubilitatem) in contractual nature, but that through divine institution, marriage
becomes the sign of the absolutely indissoluble union between Christ and the Church. See
Disputationum Roberti Bellarmini, De Controversiis Christianae Fidei Adversus Huius
Temporis Haereticos (Venice: apud loannem Malachinum, 1721) 617-619.
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the process of secularization. 42 It was Enlightenment thought, however,
that required complete secularization. Eighteenth century theorists such
as John Locke tended to reduce marriage to a civil contract, which could
be formed and broken through the will of the parties.4 3 Although the En-
lightenment was not a monolithic movement, suffice it to say that by the
conclusion of the twentieth century, the Enlightenment approach had
gradually eroded and supplanted religious perspectives. During the
twentieth century, the preservation of the Catholic tradition was evident
in canon 1013 of the 1917 code which identified the essential properties
of the sacrament of marriage as unity and indissolubility.4 5 At Vatican II,
Gaudium et spes expressed the concern that marriage and family life
were under attack as a result of negative social, political, and legal con-
ditions.46 In defense of the sacredness of marriage, the conciliar decree
recognized the bond of love between the spouses and the procreation of
children as the co-equal ends of marriage. 4 7 This recognition opened the
possibilities for a deeper and more profound understanding of the mean-
ing of human sexuality.4 8 At the same time, the tribunals of the Church
42 Luther's attack on the sacramentality of marriage also called for the transfer of ju-
risdiction over marriage from the ecclesiastical to secular authorities. See Witte, From
Sacrament to Contract, 53-61.
43 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1698), Peter Laslett, ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) 11, 77-83.
44 See Witte, From Sacrament to Contract, 202-215.
45 1917 code, canon 1013: "§ 1. The primary end of marriage is the procreation and ed-
ucation of children; the secondary is the mutual support and remedy for concupiscence.
§ 2. The essential properties of marriage are unity and indissolubility, which in Christian
marriage attain a special permanency by way of the sacrament." Father Felix Cappello,
S.J., distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic indissolubility. Intrinsic indissolubility
applies to all marriages without regard to whether or not the parties are baptized, and
means that the marriage may not be dissolved by the will of the spouses. Extrinsic indis-
solubility recognizes that the competent ecclesiastical authority has the power to dissolve
marriage under certain circumstances as, for example, pursuant to the Pauline Privilege or
in privilege of faith cases. See Felix M. Cappello, S.J., Tractatus Canonico-Moralis de
Sacramentis, vol. V, De Matrimonio (Rome: Marietti, 1961) n. 45.
46 See Gaudium et spes, 47 in Austin Flannery, OP., ed., Vatican Council II, The Con-
ciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, vol. 1 (Northport, New York: Costello Publishing.
1992) 949.
47 See Gaudium et spes, 48; Flannery, 950.
48 See Bernard de Lanversin, "Vatican II and Marriage, The Sacred Foundations of the
Order of Creation in Natural Marriage," in Rene Latourelle, Vatican II, Assessment and
Perspectives, Tientv -five Years After (1962-1987), vol. 2 (New York: Paulist Press. 1989)
179-198 (hereinafter "Latourelle"); Antoni Stankiewicz, "The Canonical Significance of
Marital Communion," in Latourelle, 206-209.
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both in the particular churches and at the level of the Holy See have dis-
cerned that the formation of the sacramental bond of the spouses can
often be inhibited by various factors. 49 The work of the tribunals properly
understood constitutes an affirmation of the Catholic understanding of
the indissolubility of marriage.
50
II. The Principle of Indissolubility
An essential aspect of the predominant secularized view of marriage
and family life remains the focus of the subjective autonomy of the indi-
vidual person. The modern perspective defines freedom as the absence of
restraint placed on the individual through governmental and other insti-
tutional sources of authority. 51 The consequences of this approach are in-
creasingly evident in the Western world. During the last fifty years in the
United States, for example, the divorce rate has rapidly accelerated with
the result that almost fifty percent of all marriages end in divorce. 52 Re-
cent studies have strongly suggested that the culture of divorce has
caused serious problems both for the spouses and their children. In a
landmark longitudinal study, Judith Wallerstein has documented the
emotional and financial damage done to women and children as a result
of divorce. 53 The work of Linda Waite and Maggie Gallagher further sup-
ports the conclusion that persons in intact families are generally better
off financially and emotionally than their counterparts from divorced
49 See e.g., Raymond L. Burke, "Vatican II and Matrimonial Law, The Perspective of
Canon 1095," in Latourelle, 217-230; Brian Ferme, "The Shifting Boundaries on Inca-
pacity for Marriage." Forum 3 (1992) 25-43.
50 Cf. Robert H. Vasoli, What God Has Joined Together, The Annulment Crisis in
American Catholicism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 200-213. He criticizes
the tribunals in the United States for not adequately safeguarding the indissolubility of
marriage.
51 See John J. Coughlin, O.F.M., "Natural Law, Marriage, and the Thought of Karol
Wojtyla," Fordham Urban Law Journal 28 (2001) 1771, 1783-84.
52 See Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 117th ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997) tbl. 145. The data indicates that
the national divorce rate has leveled-off at approximately fifty percent of all marriages,
and may be in a slight decline.
53 See Judith S. Wallerstein, Julia M. Lewis and Sandra Blakeslee, The Unexpected
Legac v of Divorce, A 25 Year Landmark Study (New York: Hyperion Press, 2000)
294-316. On the basis of a twenty-five year longitudinal study, the authors conclude that
divorce has left damaging social, psychological, and financial effects on spouses and chil-
dren.
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families. 54 During the last three decades of the twentieth century in the
United States, more than thirty percent of children were born to single
mothers; almost seventy percent of the young persons convicted of seri-
ous felonies were raised in single or non-parent homes; and over twenty
percent of pregnancies ended in abortion.
55
Concerned about this distressing picture of contemporary Western so-
ciety, Pope John Paul II has articulated a call to renew the Catholic tradi-
tion on marriage. His attention to the principle of indissolubility, which
constituted the vast portion of his January 2002 address, was directed
specifically to the officials of the Roman Rota, but clearly was also in-
tended as an encouragement to Catholics and all persons of good will.
56
The papal analysis contrasts positive and negative conceptions of free-
dom. 57 Negative freedom views indissolubility as a restriction on the au-
tonomy of individuals. It sees indissolubility as an extrinsic imposition
that offends the subjective preference of the person. It denies the neces-
sity of life long and exclusive commitments for the good of individuals
and society as a whole. In contrast, positive freedom understands mar-
riage as a fundamental good. It is a "freedom for" rather than merely a
"freedom from." It testifies to the natural human capacity to consent to an
indissoluble covenant. It recognizes that marriage is more than a contract
based on subjective preference, but rather an objective social reality.
58
The pope is suggesting that individual human fulfillment as well as a
healthy social reality depends on the correct balance between negative
and positive conceptions of freedom. In his analysis, true freedom cannot
be in opposition to marriage thus understood.59
An important part of a balanced perspective on freedom depends on an
appreciation of the sacred nature of the marital covenant. In the Catholic
understanding of marriage, the natural capacity of the person for consent
to an enduring and intimate relationship is enhanced by the grace that the
54 See Linda J. Waite and Maggie Gallagher, The Case for Marriage, Why Married
People Are Happier, Healthier and Better Off Financially (New York: Doubleday, 2000)
82-83, 123. On the basis of statistical surveys, they conclude that married persons and
their children in general are emotionally and financially better-off than divorced persons
and their offspring.
55 See John Witte, Jr., "The Meanings of Marriage," First Things, No. 126 (October
2002) 30.
56 See John Paul II, 2002 address to Roman Rota, 5,51 Ibid., at 2.
51 Ibid., 9.
59 Ibid., 4.
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spouses receive in a sacramental marriage. 60 Such an appreciation is es-
sential to understanding the Western tradition of marriage, which took
root in this religious perspective. 61 A core component of the religious
perspective is the evangelical focus on self-sacrifice as essential to the in-
dividual, family and ecclesial well being.62 The Pauline analogy of
Christ's donative love means that the spouses in marriage understand
what they are undertaking and are sufficiently self-possessed so that they
have the capacity to give themselves away to each other.63 For the
Catholic spouses in a sacramental marriage, the positive freedom is not
simply a natural good but a supernatural reality. From this sacramental
perspective, an indissoluble commitment is not only possible but a real-
ity in accord with the teaching and example of Christ.
111. Application to Lawyers
The affirmation of the indissolubility of marriage does not mean that
the Holy Father is unaware of or unsympathetic to the unfortunate, often
tragic, circumstances in which divorced persons find themselves. He has
urged pastoral sensitivity and charity for persons who are divorced.64
The pope has also spoken forcefully about the equality and dignity of
women, offenses against women, abuse of children, and abandonment of
spouse and children. 65 As mentioned at the outset, the controversy sur-
rounding John Paul II's allocution is attributable to several brief sen-
tences, which appear toward the conclusion of his talk. Given the signif-
icance of the indissolubility of marriage, the Pontiff cautioned that
"professionals in the field of civil law should avoid being personally in-
volved in anything that might imply cooperation with divorce."6 6 Per-
haps, a literalist reading of this statement would seem to establish a rule
that a Catholic lawyer can never handle a divorce case. In my opinion, a
60 See 1983 code, Canon 1055 § 1: "The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a
woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole of life and which is or-
dered by its nature to the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of off-
spring, has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament between the bap-
tized."
61 See Witte, From Sacrament to Contract, 218-219.
62 See John Paul II, 2002 address to Roman Rota, 5. See also Karol Wojtyla, Love and
Responsibility, H. T. Willetts, trans. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981) 126-129.
63 See Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 126-129.
64 See e.g., John Paul II, apostolic constitution, Familiaris consortio, November 22,
1981, no. 84: AAS 74 (1982) 81-191.
65 Ibid., 23-24.
66 John Paul II, 2002 address to Roman Rota, 9.
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more balanced interpretation is warranted from the both the text itself
and its context in the Catholic tradition.
A. Lawyers As Autonomous Agents
Let me first consider the case of lawyers as independent professionals.
In order to understand exactly what the Holy Father said, it is helpful to
recall his entire statement:
Lawyers, as independent professionals, should always decline
the use of the profession for an end that is contrary to justice, as
is divorce. They can only cooperate in this kind of activity when,
in the intention of the client, it is not directed to the break-up of
marriage, but to the securing of other legitimate effects that can
be obtained through such a judicial process in the established
legal order (cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 2383). In
this way, with their work of assisting and reconciling persons
who are going through a marital crisis, lawyers truly serve the
rights of the person and avoid becoming mere technicians at the
service of any interest whatever.
67
To start, the quoted text contains a qualification in its application. It per-
tains to lawyers as "independent professionals." Lawyers are independent
to the extent that they enjoy autonomy in the selection of their clients. The
recognition coincides with the classical description of the lawyer as an au-
tonomous agent with the right to accept or decline certain cases and
clients. 68 Lawyers are professional in that they are to put self-interest in a
secondary position to the interests of their clients.69 The professional's
counsel and advocacy intend to set the optimal conditions for the genuine
human fulfillment of the client. Membership in a profession also implies
that lawyers are expected to contribute to the common good.70 They are
67 See John Paul II, 2002 address to Roman Rota, 9.
68 See A.B.A., Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (2002), Rule 1.16(a), in
John S. Dzienkowski, ed., Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules & Statutes, 2002-
2003 ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 2002) 79.
69 See Rodes, "Forming An Agenda-Ethics and Legal Ethics," 986-987.
70 See William Simon, "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,'" Harvard Law Review 101
(1988) 1083, 1090. He suggests that lawyers should take action to promote justice. David
B. Wilkins, "In Defense of Law and Morality . ," William and Mary Law Review 38
(1996) 273, 293. He argues that lawyers should act ethically in accord with the purpose of
the law.
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not "mere technicians" devoted to their craft without concern for the con-
sequences of the service rendered.71
The first sentence of the quotation refers to the Catholic lawyer as an
independent professional who is not to act contrary to justice in a divorce
case. The lawyer who enables a client with an evil intention to acquire a
judicial sentence of divorce formally cooperates in evil. Divorce based
on subjective preference contradicts the principle of indissolubility. The
pope's prohibition urges the Catholic lawyer not to contribute to the cul-
ture of divorce. In this regard, Catholic lawyers, especially those who are
public officials, have an affirmative duty to work for laws that respect the
sanctity of marriage and family life.72
The second sentence of the quotation establishes a significant excep-
tion to the prohibition. It allows that lawyers may cooperate in divorce
cases depending on the good intention of the client. According to tradi-
tional Catholic moral analysis, cooperation in the bad will of another con-
stitutes sinful formal cooperation. 73 The spouse who seeks the breakup of
marriage through divorce merely as a matter of personal convenience, to
remarry another person who seems more desirable at a given moment, or
for personal financial gain as a result of the distribution of the marital as-
sets, exemplifies the bad will with which an independent professional
should decline to cooperate. In contrast, an individual may seek divorce
for a variety of morally valid reasons. The quotation cites the Catechism
of the Catholic Church, which identifies several legitimate effects of a
civil decree of divorce:
If civil divorce remains the only possible way of ensuring certain
legal rights, the care of the children, or the protection of inheri-
tance, it can be tolerated and does not constitute a moral offense.74
This statement helps to clarify the intention of the client. First, civil di-
vorce must be the only possible option open to the client to ensure certain
71 See Coughlin, "Natural Law, Marriage, and the Thought of Karol Wojtyla," 1773.
72 See John Paul II, 2002 address to Roman Rota, 9.
73 St. Alphonsus Liguori articulated the classic statement about cooperation: "That
[cooperation] is formal which occurs in the bad will of the other, and it cannot be without
sin.. . Idem, Theologia Moralis, L. Gaud6 ed., 4 vols. (Rome: Ex Typographia Vaticana,
1905-1912) 1:357 (lib. It, §63), cited in Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol.
3, Difficult Moral Questions (Quincy, Illinois: Franciscan Press, 1997) 876.
74 Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1994)
573, n. 2383.
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legal effects. Second, the three legitimate effects identified include the
protection of individual rights, the well-being of the children and proper
stewardship of personal wealth such as that gained through inheritance.
It follows that a Catholic lawyer may represent a client who seeks a di-
vorce when all other options have failed and the client intends a legiti-
mate effect rather than the mere break-up of the marriage. This is not a
prohibited formal cooperation because the intention of the client is not an
evil one.
It must, of course, be remembered that civil divorce does not dissolve
the natural and sacramental bond of marriage. 75 As the Holy Father recalls
earlier in this talk, marriage always enjoys the favor of law.76 Prior to
granting an annulment of a marriage, the ecclesiastical tribunals of the
United States require that the parties have secured a civil divorce. 77 The
main point of the Holy Father's allocution to the officials of the Roman
Rota focuses on the indissolubility of marriage. He, nevertheless, recog-
nizes that the mission of the ecclesiastical tribunals "belongs to the whole
area of pastoral service" which is indispensable for "authentic charity.'
7 8
A married person, who has secured a civil divorce, enjoys the legal right
to request that a Church tribunal consider a nullity of marriage case.79 The
civil lawyer, who assists the right intentioned person in securing the civil
divorce, serves as a necessary instrument that prepares the way for the ex-
ercise of justice and charity by the ecclesiastical tribunal.
As the Catholic lawyer's determination turns on the intentionality of
the client, the issue arises of how to reach ajudgment about the good will
of the client. Sometimes a person's intentionality is clear and unilateral,
but given the tangle of somatic, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual fac-
tors that might lead one to seek a divorce, motivations are often mixed and
complicated. 80Appreciating the vulnerability and confusion of the client
75 See 1983 code, canon 1141: "A marriage that is ratum et consummatum can be dis-
solved by no human power and by no cause, except death."
76 See 1983 code, canon 1060: "Marriage possesses the favor of law; therefore, in a
case of doubt, the validity of a marriage must be upheld until the contrary is proven."
77 See Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, 179, who suggests that the reason for this ap-
proach is that the tribunals do not want to encourage separation of the spouses or open the
diocese to suit as a result of the annulment process.
78 John Paul II, 2002 Address to the Roman Rota, 1.
79 1983 code, canon 1674, 10, specifying that the spouses are qualified to challenge a
marriage.
80 See Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, Andrzej Potocki, trans. (Dordrecht: D. Rei-
del Publishing, 1979) 54-56. He discusses the complexity of the emotions and feelings of
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who seeks to initiate divorce proceedings, the conscientious Catholic
lawyer must recognize the limitations of professional competencies.
8 1
Referral for appropriate counseling to a priest, religious, marriage coun-
selor and/or psychiatric professional may serve to insure that every possi-
bility for reconciliation has been exhausted prior to a hasty or malformed
decision on the client's part.82 Such a practice is one means through which
the Catholic attorney can assist the client in forming the right intention.
For one who finds meaning in Catholic faith, it will be of enduring value
to know that he or she has exhausted the human possibilities to enable rec-
onciliation and avoid divorce. This is the peace that comes from believing
that one has surrendered oneself to divine grace.
At the same time, the attorney's legal counseling of a client almost
necessarily touches upon the client's motivations and reasons for seeking
the effects of the judicial process. This affords the attorney, within the
proper parameters of professional competency, the opportunity to assist
the client in clarifying and evaluating motivations. 83 In most cases, this
process will result in greater clarity for the client and attorney. Undoubt-
edly, there will still be a few difficult cases, when even subsequent to ap-
propriate referral and counseling, the attorney remains uncertain about a
client's decision. In such cases, the Catholic attorney should proceed
only in accord with a conscientious and informed prudence. In my opin-
ion, truly doubtful cases must be resolved infavorem matromonii.
B. Judges, Lawyers and Material Cooperation
Not all lawyers find themselves in a position of complete autonomy
with regard to the legal services that they may render. Pope John Paul II
acknowledges that some professionals in the field of civil law, and he ex-
pressly mentions judges, may find that it is burdensome, if not practically
the human person for the purpose of moral action. See also Lynda Robitaille, "Evaluating
Proofs: Is It Becoming A Lost Art?," The Jurist 57 (1997) 541, 548, who suggests the im-
portance of the judge's human qualities in evaluating the statements by parties and wit-
nesses.
81 See Coughlin, "Natural Law, Marriage, and the Thought of Karol Wojtyla," 1785.
82 See Kenneth Kressel, et al., "A Provisional Typology of Lawyer Attitudes Towards
Divorce Practice; Gladiators, Advocates, Counselors and Journeymen," in Frederica K.
Lombard, ed., Readings in Family Law (1990) 123. This article discusses the roles of
counselor and advocate of the attorney in a divorce case.
83 See William H. Simon, "Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case,"
Maryland Law Review 50 (1991) 213. He distinguishes between lawyers who value client
autonomy from those who act in a paternalistic manner.
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impossible, to avoid involvement in divorce cases. When an exemption is
possible, legal professionals should refuse to cooperate as a sign of "con-
scientious objection" to an unjust legal arrangement.8 4 Nonetheless, con-
tinued employment, financial security for self and family, as well as the
opportunity for legitimate advancement may depend on cooperation in
divorce cases. The pope advises such judges and legal professionals to
act in accord with the traditional Catholic principles of material cooper-
ation.8 5 St. Alphonsus Liguori articulated the classic statement about ma-
terial cooperation.8 6 Material cooperation in another's evil act is permis-
sible when: (1) the cooperator's act is good or indifferent in itself; (2) the
cooperator has a reason for acting that is just; and (3) the cooperator's
reason is proportionate to the gravity of the wrongdoing and to the close-
ness of the assistance.
1. The Act and its Reason
The first and second of Alphonsus' conditions are quite similar, and I
shall treat them together.87 In the context of divorce, the "wrongdoer" is
the moving party who seeks the divorce for an illegitimate end. An ille-
gitimate end falls outside the specific parameters identified above. When
it is clear that the party seeking divorce has an illegitimate end, the moti-
vation and object of the cooperator's action must remain distinguishable
from that of the wrongdoer. The distinction may be identified in such le-
gitimate acts and reasons as, inter alia: continued employment and the fi-
nancial care of self and other dependents; service to the legal system and
the provision of justice in general; and the individual and collective op-
portunities to bring the Catholic tradition into divorce law.
84 See John Paul II, 2002 Address to Roman Rota, 9. See also Angel Rodrfquez Lufio,
"Evangelium Vitae 73: The Catholic Lawmaker and the Problem of a Seriously Unjust
Law," L'Osservatore Romano, English Edition (September 18, 2002) 3-5.
85 John Paul II, 2002 Address to Roman Rota, 9: "For grave and proportionate motives
they may therefore act in accord with the traditional principles of material cooperation."
86 "That [cooperation] is material which occurs only in the bad action of the other,
apart from the cooperator's intention. But the latter [material cooperation] is licit when the
action is good or indifferent in itself; and when one has reason for doing it that is both just
and proportioned to the gravity of the other's sin and to the closeness of the assistance
which is thereby given to the carrying out of that sin." St. Alphonsus Ligouri, Theologia
Moralis, 1905-12, 1:357 (lib. II, §63), cited in Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, 876.
87 See Grisez, Difficult Moral Question, 876. He observes that the first two of the condi-
tions are similar and do not generally present difficult problems of analysis.
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2. Proportionality
The third of the traditional conditions for morally permissible mater-
ial cooperation raises the issue of proportionality.8 8 Since the issues sur-
rounding proportionality almost always need to be considered in light of
the facts of a particular case, I shall limit my discussion to several more
generic issues in relation to material cooperation in divorce. 89 As shall be
evident, questions of proportionality do not easily admit clear answers.
90
I shall first discuss proportionality in terms of the moral gravity of di-
vorce, and second consider proportionality in relation to the closeness of
the assistance rendered.
a. The Gravity of the Wrongdoing
When considering proportionality in relation to the "gravity of the
wrongdoing," one might recall Pope John Paul's metaphor that divorce
has "spread through the social body like a plague." 9 1 Consistent with the
pontifical metaphor, in order to fulfill the third condition it would seem
that material cooperation in the spreading of a plague would require a
countervailing reason of a rather significant gravity. An individual stance
by a prominent Catholic jurist, who is known to decline divorce cases,
may make a statement about the evils associated with divorce. The im-
pact of a significant group of Catholic judges and attorneys who refuse to
cooperate in divorce could prove considerable. Given the culture of di-
vorce, such a stance would possess prophetic meaning.
Additionally, one must consider the scandal created by the coopera-
tion of Catholic jurists in divorce cases. 9 Sometimes the fact that good
persons cooperate in the wrong of divorce may communicate the mes-
sage that divorce is not so evil after all. This is almost certainly to be the
interpretation adopted by the parties to the divorce. The damage that is
done to the individual and the Catholic community by such scandalous
conduct could weaken many persons' willingness to make the sacrifices
88 See John Paul II, 2002 address to the Roman Rota, 9. See also Rodes, "Forming An
Agenda-Ethics and Legal Ethics," 984-985.
89 See Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, 876-889.
9) See Aloysio Sabetti, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, ad novum Codicem
Iuris Canonici concinnatum a Timotheo Barrett, S.J. (New York: Frederick Pustet Co.,
1939) nn. 194-195,190-191.
91 Pope John Paul II, 2002 address to Roman Rota, 8, citing Gaudium et spes, n. 47
92 See Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, 881.
THE JURIST
necessary to keep a marriage together. The scandal might also communi-
cate to other judges and lawyers that cooperation in evil such as divorce
is somehow morally acceptable.
Finally, one must consider the bad effects of the cooperation in pro-
portion to the good that is to be accomplished. Children in particular are
the victims of divorce. Prior to divorce, they have likely experienced sig-
nificant disharmony in family life as the parents begin to manifest the
stress and anxiety that inevitably accompany the decision to separate.
93
Children in these circumstances are already in need of healing and rec-
onciliation. To the contrary, divorce will likely only exacerbate the diffi-
culties. The message that is communicated to them may well contradict
the truth about the indissolubility of marriage and the sanctity of family
life. The cooperator thus facilitates the general breakdown of that unit
which is so necessary to the education of children and the stability of
society.
These kinds of social and individual evils must weigh heavily against
material cooperation in divorce. On the other hand, if every Catholic
judge and legal professional must refrain from such material coopera-
tion, the effect could be to diminish or even eliminate the possibility for
the "wisely handled reconciliation" envisioned by the Holy Father.
94
Both in individual instances and for society as a whole, the Catholic
lawyer is in a privileged position. He or she brings the truth of Catholic
faith to the situation. The Catholic lawyer serves as an instrument of truth
about indissolubility as well as the compassion of Christ.
b. Closeness of Assistance
When considering proportionality in terms of the closeness of assis-
tance, the assistance is often characterized as proximate or remote.95 The
assistance of a professional such as a judge or attorney is almost always
likely to be proximate in that their action directly facilitates the divorce.
Although it is proximate, forgoing the cooperation will in all likelihood
not prevent the divorce. While a Catholic judge might recuse him/herself
from a divorce case, the unfortunate reality remains that there are proba-
bly at least several other judges in the jurisdiction who will be willing to
hear the case and not be guided by considerations of the indissolubility
93 See Wallerstein, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce, 296.
94 John Paul II, 2002 address to Roman Rota, 9.
95 See Sabetti and Barrett, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, n. 194, 190.
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of marriage. To an even greater extent, it seems fair to assume that this is
the situation with regard to the availability of divorce lawyers.
The interpersonal nature of a Catholic lawyer's cooperation in divorce
also raises an issue of proportionality in regard to the closeness of the as-
sistance rendered. Continuous interaction with wrongdoers "tends to
generate psychological bonds and interdependence." 96 The initial deci-
sion about material cooperation in a given case might be well reasoned.
As continuous opportunities for cooperation present themselves, the co-
operator may become less careful in reaching a moral decision about
whether participation in the case is justifiable. Moreover, we tend to be-
come what we do.9 7 The more that one cooperates in divorce cases, the
more one may discover a personally diminished capacity in terms of
one's own ability to resist evil.
Alternatively, a Catholic attorney, with the correct intention, might in
fact be strengthened through confrontation with the evil of "the divorce
mentality."9 8 Encountering the fallen nature of the human situation could
serve to reinforce the truth of Christ's teaching and the Church's tradition
on divorce. As St. Paul said, "Where sin abounds, grace abounds all the
more." 99 Such a lawyer would exercise the priesthood of all the baptized
in dealing with divorced persons and their family members. This is pre-
cisely the role identified for the laity at Vatican 11. 100
Conclusion
Pope John Paul II's advice to lawyers about divorces cases was a bit
more nuanced than the media depicted. The papal position reflects the
radical teaching of Jesus and its rich development through two millennia
of Catholic tradition. Given the culture of divorce and its negative impact
on individuals and society, the Holy Father has affirmed the principle of
indissolubility to advance the sanctity of marriage and family life. In ac-
cord with the principle, Catholic lawyers should not contribute to the cul-
ture of divorce, but they should be active participants in establishing a
legal order that promotes genuine human fulfillment and social well
96 See Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, 880.
97 See Wojtyla, The Acting Person, 171-172.
98 John Paul II, 2002 address to the Roman Rota, 5.
99 Cf. Rom. 6: 1.
10o See Lumen gentium, n. 10, in Austin Flannery, OP., ed., Vatican Council II, The
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, vol. 1 (Northport, New York: Costello Publish-
ing, 1992) 360-361.
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being. When divorce remains the only way to ensure certain good effects,
the lawyer as an independent professional may facilitate the case consis-
tent with the right intention of the client. For judges and lawyers who
enjoy less autonomy in the selection of cases, the traditional norms of
material cooperation apply. This requires a careful consideration of the
issues of proportionality. The application of the norms of proportionality
does not afford simple answers and must be considered on a case by case
basis. The Catholic judge or attorney who handles a divorce case should
guard against an unreflective and technical approach, and rather always
be guided by the truth of the tradition, which respects individuals and the
common good.
